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Citizen Suits in the Environmental
Field: Peril or Promise? t
Roger C. Cramton*
Barry B. Boyer**
Private citizen litigation has often been mentioned as the most
direct method of allowing citizens actively to pursue a quality environ-
ment. A variety of proposals have been introduced and attempted
both in state legislatures and in Congress. With the proposed House
and Senate legislation in mind, this Article warns that the major pro-
posals presently being considered may ultimately prove to be detri-
mental rather than beneficial to the cause of environmental preserva-
tion.
How shall we protect the environment? This deceptively simple
question is now confronting virtually every major business in the coun-
try, every governmental agency, every legislator, and every concerned
citizen. The awakening of the nation's environmental conscience
within the past few years has been truly dramatic, and many who
shrugged off the ecology movement as a mere passing fad have learned
to their sorrow that the public will no longer tolerate disregard for the
natural environment.
t This Article was prepared while the authors were employed by the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States, prior to their assumption of duties at the
Department of Justice. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors,
and do not necessarily reflect the views of either the Department of Justice or the
Administrative Conference of the United States.
The authors are indebted to Richard K. Berg, Executive Secretary of the Admin-
istrative Conference, for his helpful comments and suggestions.
* Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice;
Formerly, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States; B.A. 1950,
Harvard University; J.D. 1955, University of Chicago.
** Attorney Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice; B.A.
1966, Duke University; J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.
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This newfound awareness is clearly a desirable and necessary
change in our basic assumptions. It is becoming increasingly clear
that we as a nation-and perhaps as a planet--can no longer afford to
ignore the environmental consequences of our actions without risking
serious physical disruptions and social dislocations. Yet, because of
the pervasive nature of the problems, the imperfect state of our knowl-
edge about man's interaction with ecosystems, and the difficult value
judgments and tradeoffs that must be made to achieve environmental
protection, there is continuing uncertainty as to what kinds of govern-
mental institutions are best suited to the task of preventing further
degradation of our lands, waters, and air.
The most significant recent improvement in environmental de-
cision making is, of course, the impact statement requirement imposed
upon federal agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).' Although the Act is seemingly innocuous on its face-one
could hardly quarrel with the proposition that governmental bodies
should consider the environmental consequences of their actions-
NEPA has proved to be a powerful lever for forcing the agencies and
those whom they regulate to find ways of minimizing or avoiding dam-
age to the environment.2 New organizations, such as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality,
have been established to create within the Government a reservoir of
expertise on environmental problems, and to institutionalize the ad-
vocacy of ecological, scenic, cultural, and historical values. Compre-
hensive regulatory programs, such as the Clean Air Amendments of
1970,1 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,'
and the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1971,1 have
been enacted to deal with specific problems, and more legislation of this
nature may be forthcoming.6  On balance, there has been a rather re-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). The basic requirements of NEPA impact
statements are set forth in section 102(2) (c) of the Act. Id. § 4332(2) (c).
2. For a description of the changes which NEPA is making in the Federal bu-
reaucracy, see Cramton & Berg, Enforcing the National Environmental Policy Act in
Federal Agencies, 18 PRAc. LAW. 79 (1972). For a discussion of the effect of the
impact statement requirement on the AEC's regulations for granting construction
permits and operating licenses for nuclear power reactors and fuel reprocessing plants
see Note, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 558 (1972).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp.
V, 1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970) ). See generally Trumbull,
Federal Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283 (1972).
4. Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972), 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4825,
formerly 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970). The bill was passed over a presidential veto.
Washington Post, Oct. 19, 1972, at Al, col. 1.
5. Pub. L. No. 92-516 (Oct. 21, 1972), 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5013, amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 135 et seq. (1970).
6. For a list of major pending legislation see ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 150 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT].
(Vol. 2: 407
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markable flow of energy, talent and resources into the environmental
area within the past few years.
Still, there is substantial and understandable discontent among
the nation's environmentalists. The achievement of fundamental
change in large organizations, whether in the public or private sector,
is a slow and often frustrating process. In the meantime, pollutants
continue to fill the air and waters, and unique natural resources may
be irretrievably lost. As a result, a number of articulate spokesmen
for environmental causes have begun to assert that a different ap-
proach is needed: that the most expeditious and effective method of
halting threats to the environment is to allow individual citizens or
public interest groups to bring lawsuits directly against alleged pol-
luters, and to empower the courts to re-examine fully on the merits all
administrative decisions affecting the environment. 7  While most of
the arguments which have been advanced in favor of such citizen
suits deserve serious consideration, we believe that the major propos-
als for the creation of broad private rights to sue for purposes of en-
vironmental protection are neither philosophically sound nor carefully
crafted, and that if enacted they could ultimately prove a serious set-
back rather than a victory for the cause of preserving our environ-
ment.
7. The leading work in the field is a book by Professor Joseph L. Sax. J. SAx,
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1970) [hereinafter
cited as CITIZEN AcrIoNi. See also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Re-
source Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Public Trust Doctrine].
The principal bills introduced in the Ninety-Second Congress which incorporate
this approach are S. 1032, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), and H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971). Since these companion bills are similar in their essential provisions this
Article will focus upon H.R. 8331. Another bill, H.R. 49, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), is of similar effect. Some of the major differences between H.R. 8331 and
H.R. 49 are as follows:
(a) H.R. 8331 would permit suits to be brought by any aggrieved person or
organization, while H.R. 49 is limited to class actions.
(b) H.R. 8331 allows only declaratory or injunctive relief while H.R. 49
also provides for recovery of money damages.
(c) H.R. 49 does not create a right of action for "pollution, impairment or
destruction of the . . . public trust of the United States," as provided in
section 303 of H.R. 8331.
(d) H.R. 8331 explicitly provides for judicial review of federal and state
agency action, while section 304 of H.R. 49 provides that the bill would
not "preempt or otherwise interfere with any Federal or State law."
(e) H.R. 49 imposes liability due to "any pollution of air or water or . . .
creation of any unreasonable noise," while H.R. 8331 provides broad
standards under which the defendant may attempt to show that the
harm to the environment is socially justifiable.
The texts of H.R. 49, H.R. 8331, and S. 1032 are set forth in Appendices A, B and
C. For a detailed analysis of an earlier but essentially identical version of S. 1032 see
Comment, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescripton for




A. Legitimacy of Decision-Making Authority
A key premise of the broad citizen-suit proposals is the belief that
regulatory agencies inevitably become captives of those whom they are
supposed to regulate, and that even if an agency is diligently attempting
to enforce its statutory mandate, the sordid realities of bureaucractic
survival in a highly political atmosphere will compel it to compromise
enforcement decisions to an unacceptable degree." The remedy,
therefore, is to shift the primary decision-making authority from the
agencies to the courts, which are insulated from day-to-day political
pressures and free from the "insider perspective" that results from
single-minded expertise.' This shift can be accomplished by stripping
away the worn-out doctrinal baggage of ripeness, exhaustion, primary
jurisdiction, the substantial evidence rule, deference to administrative
discretion, and similar technicalities which prevent the courts from
getting at the guts of environmental problems. 10
8. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1032 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 202 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings] (testimony of Ralph Nader):
The daily damage being done to our air, our water, and our land should be
sufficient to convince us that what passes for agency "expertise" is often
nothing more than institutionalized private power against the public interest.
By giving our industry-ridden administrative agencies a monopoly in the area
of discretionary decisionmaking, we have in effect handed over the job of
defending the environment to the wealthy and powerful institutions who are
destroying it.
The public's defenselessness is exacerbated by a host of additional legal
barriers to redress in the courts.
Cf. 116 CONG. REC. 6579 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McGovern on introducing S. 3575,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), a predecessor to S. 1032):
These cases [challenging Government activity affecting the environment] in-
dicate the discontent that many citizens feel with the public agencies that are
supposed to be protecting the public interest. They indicate the widespread
feeling [that] public agencies regulating private interests often end up not
regulating but representing that private interest.
9. See CITIZEN AcTION, supra note 7, at 53:
From the inside perspective of a government agency, hard choices must be
made. An agency has its own priorities and legislative program; it has con-
flicting constituencies among which it must mediate, and in whose eyes it
must-for its own good-appear to have a balanced position; it has a budget
to consider and thereby a need for friends in the legislature.
10. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 202, 243-44 (statements of
Robert M. Hallman & Charles R. Halpern on behalf of Common Cause, Inc.);
Letter from Prof. Joseph Sax to Congressman John Dingell, May 18, 1971, at 5, on
file with the Ecology Law Quarterly [hereinafter cited as Sax Letter].
The requirements of ripeness and exhaustion of administrative remedies are both
primarily concerned with the timing of judicial review of administrative action. The
requirement of ripeness is based on the principle that courts should focus their atten-
tion on problems which are real and present or imminent, and not squander judicial
energy on those which are abstract, hypothetical, or remote. 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINIs-
[Vol. 2:.407
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Like most clich6s, this argument contains a germ of truth and a
high degree of misleading oversimplification. Until recent years,
many administrative agencies have been the ignored stepchildren of
the Government, escaping the harsh scrutiny of the public eye and be-
coming deeply reinforced in the performance of narrow missions by
the political process."1 As any administrator can testify, those calm
days are rapidly vanishing, and public criticism is increasingly vocal
and informed. The agencies' response, while often slow, has been
significant. The possibility of real and enduring reform in Govern-
ment administration is probably greater now than it has been in many
years.
At the least, history should caution against too ready acceptance
of the courts as an alternative to the agencies. After all, it has not
been long since proponents of the New Deal argued that creation of
administrative agencies was necessary in order to overcome the ob-
structionist tendencies of the courts, 2 and even in more recent times
judges have occasionally proven themselves to be as insensitive as any
bureaucrat to the needs of the environment. 1 On a more fundamen-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21.01 (1958). The exhaustion requirement is founded on
the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judi-
cial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed adminis-
trative remedy has been exhausted.
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, unlike the doctrines of ripeness and ex-
haustion, does not govern the timing of judicial review or administrative action, but
rather is used to determine whether the court or the agency should make the initial
decision of a problem. It is premised on the rule that cases which raise issues of fact
that are not within the conventional experience of judges or which require the exer-
cise of administrative discretion should first be decided by the appropriate agency,
subject, of course, to later judicial review. The doctrine is in essence, then, a recogni-
tion of the fact that the work of agencies and of courts should be orderly and sensibly
coordinated. 3 K. DAVIS, supra, § 19.01.
The substantial evidence rule is employed by courts to define the scope of judicial
review of administrative action. The rule provides in essence that courts, in re-
viewing agency actions, should decide questions of law, but limit themselves to the test
of reasonableness in reviewing questions of fact. Id. at § 29.01.
Finally, the doctrine of deference to administrative discretion is based on the rec-
ognition by courts that there are cases which, because of their complex and unique
factual background or because of other special circumstances, are incapable of adequate
judicial resolution and should be properly left to the expertise of the appropriate ad-
ministrative agency. See generally 4 id. §H 28.06-.07.
11. See generally Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L.
REV. 1069 (1971).
12. For an analysis of the relative merits of courts and agencies in the New
Deal context see Oppenheimer, The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 37 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1937).
13. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 1 ERC 1669 (9th Cir. 1970),
ajfd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 3 ERC 2039 (1972); cf.
Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 203 (testimony of Ralph Nader):
If a citizen is fortunate enough to ever get to the merits of his [en-
vironmental] case [in court], he may run into precedent extending from the
1972]
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tal level, however, the argument against the agencies errs because it
fails to take adequate account of the comparative institutional capa-
bilities of courts and agencies to deal with environmental problems.
Proper environmental decision making is not merely a matter of
quantifying and totaling up costs and benefits, although this in itself
is an immensely difficult task and one that is susceptible to heavy value
inputs at each stage of the process. 14  Rational resolution of environ-
mental problems also involves benefit and resource-distribution judg-
ments which affect broad segments of the economy and population,
questions which are necessarily highly political in nature.
For example, determination of whether thermal and chemical dis-
charges in a particular stream should be wholly or partially abated
raises a series of issues such as whether the possibility of increased lo-
cal and regional unemployment, or increased costs to consumers of
goods produced there, or losses to stockholders of affected companies,
are justified by preservation of the ecological or recreational features
of the stream. At a broader level, issues may be raised as to whether
a growth economy and expanding gross national product are appro-
priate national goals, and whether demand for certain types of prod-
ucts, such as electricity, should be curtailed in order to protect the en-
vironment. The range of potential solutions to each of these broad
problems is vast, and each possible solution may have a distinct im-
pact on different segments of society, both immediately and in the fu-
ture. There is no "right" answer to these questions, in the sense of an
authoritative solution based on the application of accepted general
principles to particular facts.
Yet, it seems clear that courts and judicial procedures are de-
signed precisely for the purpose of applying basic principles to speci-
fic factual situations. Of our major institutions of government, the
courts are-and should be-the least politically responsive. Thrust-
ing these kinds of questions into the judicial arena can only cast doubt
upon the legitimacy of the decisions made, and, ultimately, on the le-
gitimacy of the courts themselves. 15
early days of the industrial revolution which holds that the payrolls and
progress industry provides justify whatever unfortunate environmental side
effects ensue. ...
Our air, water, and soil have been the victims of a system of justice
geared to provide the greatest protection to those who need it least. On the
scale of judicial priorities, the environment comes out somewhere near the
bottom.
14. See generally J. SAx, WATER LAw, PLANNING AND POLicy 35-46 (1968).
15. C. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 222-23, 257 N.E.2d 870,
871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314, 1 ERC 1175, 1176 (1970):
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of par-
ties before it. . . . It is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in
private litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public objec-
[Vol. 2:407
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For some broad environmental issues-such as the question of
whether the Government should take steps to curb the rapidly growing
demand for electricity-the impact on national goals, economic rela-
tionships, and social values is so pervasive that Congress is the most ap-
propriate forum for decision making. For less sweeping policy issues-
such as what emission standards should be established in a particular
watershed or airshed-administrative agencies acting in a quasi-legisla-
tive capacity seem preferable to the courts.'" The agency is not only
more amenable to oversight by elected officials of the Executive
branch and Congress; it also is more capable of employing a wide
variety of procedures (e.g., legislative-type hearings, informal consul-
tations, advisory committees, and publication of notice of opportunity
to file written comments) which can assure that affected interests have
an opportunity to participate and to make their desires felt. If this
basically political process is functioning properly, it is unwise to invite
the courts to revise or reject the agency's determination.
B. Technical Competency
In addition to the basic issue of legitimacy of decision-making au-
thority, it is doubtful whether the federal courts have the technical
competency or institutional capacity to deal with broad, relatively un-
defined environmental problems. Proponents of citizen suit legisla-
tion frequently suggest that the environmental issues presented to the
court would be no more difficult than comparable issues regularly lit-
igated in areas such as antitrust. 17  This is by no means clear or self-
evident. Antitrust matters, for example, usually require input from
only a single non-legal discipline, economics, while environmental
problems frequently involve a diverse mix of unrelated disciplines
such as chemistry, biology, physics, ecology, and medicine, in addition
tives greatly beyond the rights and interests before the court.
Effective control of air pollution is a problem presently far from solution
even with the full public and financial powers of government. ...
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will depend on
technical research in great depth; on a carefully balanced consideration of
the economic impact of close regulation; and of the actual effect on public
health. It is likely to require massive public expenditure and to demand more
than any local community can accomplish and to depend on regional and
interstate controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private
litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither
equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared
to lay down and implement an effective policy for the elimination of air
pollution.
16. See generally Special Comm. on Electric Power and the Environment of the
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Electricity and the Environment: The
Reform of Legal Institutions (1972) [hereinafter cited as Electricity and the Environ-
ment).
17. See, e.g., Sax Letter, supra note 10, at 1.
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to economics. Moreover, even in the antitrust area, where the courts
have had extensive experience in grappling with complex economic data,
one can find numerous statements of judicial discontent with ad hoc
analysis and an expressed need to decide cases according to clearly
defined rules."8 Thus, the Supreme Court recently stated its reluctance
"to ramble through the wilds of economic theory:"
The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult
economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense,
destruction of competition in one sector of the economy against pro-
motion of competition in another sector is one important reason
we have formulated per se rules.""
In contrast to the courts, agencies have a considerable advantage
in their ability to use internal structuring and staffing policies in deal-
ing with complex, multifaceted problems. Agencies can subdivide
technical problems into manageable subunits for staff analysis, retain
outside consultants or create panels of independent experts, assign staff
members the task of advocating particular interests, undertake pro-
grams of testing or empirical research, and investigate various alter-
natives in a systematic fashion.20
The only comparable managerial mechanism which a court has
is the power to appoint a master,2 and this authority has traditionally
been invoked only in limited circumstances.2 2  Moreover, the use of a
18. See Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of re-
straints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit
of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly com-
plicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the
industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at
large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so of-
ten wholly fruitless when undertaken.
See also United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395-402 (1927); Van
Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. Rev. 1165 (1964).
19. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
20. For example, in passing on applications for licenses to construct atomic re-
actors, the AEC first provides a detailed review by a technical staff, then an assess-
ment by a panel of independent experts on reactor technology, and finally a public
hearing before a board composed of two technically qualified persons and a chairman
skilled in the conduct of administrative proceedings. See generally Ellis & Johnston,
Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the Atomic Energy Commission, reprinted in
Hearings on AEC Licensing Procedure and Related Legislation Before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 544
(1971). This licensing structure may not be an ideal system, but it is at least illus-
trative of the rich variety of procedures and types of tribunals available in the ad-
ministrative process.
21. Both the House and the Senate versions of the recent citizen-suit bills would
authorize the court to appoint a master. See S. 1032, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c)
(1971); H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(b) (1971), reprinted in Appendices
A-C.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b), states:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In ac-
[Vol. 2: 407
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master can greatly increase the cost to the litigants since the existing
practice is to compensate the master by assessing costs against the par-
ties."3  The use of a master can also protract the proceeding signif-
icantly, 24 without substantially relieving the burden on the court. 5
And, in non-jury cases, where the master's findings are accepted un-
less clearly erroneous,2" it is questionable whether the use of a master
in court adjudication would really be much different from judicial re-
view of an administrative proceeding.
27
C. Costs and Burdens of Participation
Another type of difficulty which would result from investing the
courts with wide-ranging authority to resolve environmental questions
tions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are
complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account
and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only
upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a) provides:
The compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court, and
should be charged upon such of the parties or paid out of any fund or sub-
ject matter to the action, which is in the custody and control of the court
as the court may direct.
24. See, e.g., Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131
F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942):
Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court, in every suit, save where
exceptional circumstances are shown. It is a matter of common knowledge
that references greatly increase the cost of litigation and delay and postpone
the end of litigation. . . . The delay in some instances is unbelievably long.
Likewise, the increase in cost is heavy. For nearly a century, litigants and
members of the bar have been crying against this avoidable burden of costs
and this inexcusable delay . . . . Greater confidence in the outcome of the
contest and more respect for the judgment of the court arise when the trial is
by the judge.
25. In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 2 ERC 1331 (1971),
the Court denied a motion for leave to file an environmental suit under its original
jurisdiction, in part because the factual issues involved were technically complex.
Despite Justice Douglas' dissenting argument that the burden on the Court would be
eased by appointment of a special master, the majority concluded:
The notion that appellate judges, even with the assistance of a most competent
Special Master, might appropriately undertake at this time to unravel these
complexities is, to say the least, unrealistic. Nor would it suffice to impose
on Ohio an unusually high standard of proof. That might serve to mitigate
our personal difficulties in seeking a just result that comports with sound
judicial administration, but would not lessen the complexity of the task of
preparing responsibly to exercise our judgment, or the serious drain on the
resources of this Court it would entail.
Id. at 504, 2 ERC at 1335.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
27. See 5A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.05, at 2940 (2d ed. 1971), where
it is noted that the policy that references to a master shall be the exception rather
than the rule
flows from (1) the function of the master to hear only those matters which it
would unduly hamper the court (or jury) to deal with; and (2) Rule 43(a)
requiring all testimony to be taken in open court, [and] is an obvious corollary
of the policy against the judiciary abrogating its functions.
1972]
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at the request of concerned citizens arises from the costs, delays, and
risks of inconsistency that currently beset the federal judicial system.
At both trial and appellate levels, the federal courts are confronted
with a serious and seemingly intractable backlog problem. The most
recently published statistics indicate that nearly ten percent of all civil
actions pending in the district courts are more than three years old,
and this backlog is highly concentrated in major metropolitan dis-
tricts.28 Even assuming that citizen plaintiffs would be willing and
able to bring their actions in the less congested districts,2 9 it would still
be possible under most of the citizen-suit proposals for companies to
use the legislation as a means of attacking Government regulatory
programs,30 or to anticipate the possibility of a citizen suit and use a
declaratory judgment action to get a forum of their own choosing."'
In these situations, the tactical advantages of delay are obvious.
Another facet of the delay problem is the balkanization of fed-
eral law which now exists in many areas, and which would be exacer-
bated by the citizen-suit proposals. The United States Supreme Court,
which is heavily involved in the resolution of constitutional contro-
versies, has only limited time to guide lower federal courts in the in-
terpretation of federal statutes and regulations. Conflicts of authority
between the circuits on many significant questions of federal law often
persist for a number of years. The growth in the number of judges on
the various courts of appeals has also made it more difficult for some
of these courts to resolve intra-circuit conflicts through the use of en
banc rehearings. Many knowledgeable observers believe that the uni-
formity and stability of federal law have been gravely impaired by the
28. See Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1971
Annual Report, 11-51 to -54.
29. The venue provisions of H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1971),
would permit the plaintiff to bring his action in "any judicial district in which the
defendant resides, transacts business or may be found." This approach seems ill-
conceived and susceptible to forum-shopping abuses. Since most environmental issues
will involve site-related factors, the most logical place t0 try them would be where "the
cause of action arose," as provided in the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391
(a), (e) (1970). This approach was recently adopted by the Second Circuit in NRDC
v. TVA, 459 F.2d 255, 3 ERC 1976 (2d Cir. 1972). In its present form, the proposed
venue provision would undoubtedly lead to numerous motions for transfer of venue
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1970). See generally Brecher, Venue in Con-
servation Cases: A Potential Pitfall for Environmental Lawyers, 2 EcoLOGY L.Q. 91
(1972).
30. NEPA has been employed for this purpose on several occasions. See, e.g.,
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 2 ERC 1373 (D. Kan.), aff'd,
455 F.2d 650, 3 ERC 1129 (10th Cir. 1971); Kalur v. Resor, 355 F. Supp. 1, 3 ERC
1458 (D.D.C. 1971). See generally 1972 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT, supra
note 6, at 254-55.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). For a recent example of the use of a de-
claratory judgment action to challenge environmental regulation, see Lake Carriers'
Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 4 ERC 1129 (1972).
[Vol. 2:407416
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growth of the number of appeals and the lengthening of the time re-
quired for the authoritative resolution of important questions of fed-
eral law.32  Placing the decision of environmental matters in district
courts, when combined with the lack of guidance on the substantive
policies to be applied, would multiply the chances for inconsistency
and conflict, and slow the process of conflict resolution even further, at
a time when uniform national and regional environmental policies are
sorely needed.
Another question which must be addressed in assessing the rela-
tive merits of courts and agencies as arbiters of environmental ques-
tions is the crucial matter of costs of participation. Substantial public
input in environmental decision making is clearly desirable, given the
nature and importance of the issues involved. At the same time,
many environmental issues are complex and therefore expensive to
litigate. Environmental organizations are often financially handi-
capped, since they usually have little financial stake in the outcome
of litigation and must rely on voluntary contributions from concerned
citizens. 3 Thus, it is particularly important that any system of en-
vironmental decision making have available some means of minimiz-
ing the burdens faced by individuals and public interest groups that
desire to participate.
In court, an environmental interest group either would have to
rely on whatever data and expert testimony it could assemble from its
own resources, or else use information elicited from the defendant
through discovery and cross-examination-both of which are expen-
sive and time-consuming processes. Provisions granting the courts
discretion to award expert witness and attorney fees have been pro-
posed in statutes regulating specific environmental problems34 and in
32. See, e.g., Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542
(1969).
33. See note 49 infra. Court litigation is probably at least as expensive as par-
ticipation in an administrative trial-type hearing involving comparable issues, and a
recent study made under the auspices of the Administrative Conference of the United
States found:
Frequently the cost of participation in an administrative proceeding mounts
into tens of thousands of dollars, and prolonged, multiple party proceedings
cost even more. Public interest groups are often financially unable to par-
ticipate. Some organized and established groups have been able to finance
participation by fund-raising, relying on foundations and individual contribu-
tions. Ad hoc committees, pro bono publico efforts of lawyers, and volun-
teered services of students and others are occasionally relied upon to meet the
cost of participation. But these random, ad hoc sources of support obvi-
ously cannot meet the cost of effective participation on a sustained and re-
liable basis.
Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 389
(1972).
34. For example, section 505(d) of the Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
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general citizen-suit bills.aa However, this seems an imperfect answer
at best. Power to award fees can be a two-edged sword, and it is con-
ceivable that a court would assess large sums against a plaintiff public
interest group if it considered the case insubstantial. Moreover, the
power to award costs is wholly discretionary with the court, and the
matter is not determined until the close of litigation. Thus, in any
event, the uncertainty of compensation may prevent plaintiffs from se-
curing adequate legal and technical assistance, particularly during the
vital period of pretrial preparation.
In the administrative context, there is a greater possibility of re-
ducing the burdens of participation. If an agency exercises its discre-
tion to attack particular problems on a general basis through notice-
and-comment rulemaking, rather than using a case-by-case approach, the
costs of presenting relevant data and views will usually be substantially
lessened, and the right to participate undisputed. 6 Even when an
agency uses trial-type proceedings, there are a number of ways in which
citizen input can be achieved more cheaply and efficiently than in a
courtroom contest. The disclosures forced by the NEPA impact state-
ment requirement, and the practice in some agencies of routinely putting
ments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972), provides that
[t]he court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this
section [to enforce a federal standard], may award costs of litigation (in-
cluding reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever
the court determines such award is appropriate.
35. For example, H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) contains a number of
provisions designed to relieve the burdens of citizen litigation. Section 306 provides
that the court may award fees for attorneys and expert witnesses. In addition, sec-
tion 303 (a) places the burden on the defendant to show that there is no "feasible and
prudent alternative" to the polluting activity, and that it is justified in cost-benefit
terms, once the plaintiff has shown some impairment of the environment. However,
since the plaintiffs initial burden is slight, and the substantive standards are vague,
it seems likely that the defendant could make a colorable showing in most cases, and
that the burden would be shifted back to the plaintiff. Even a wholly negative case,
based on cross-examination of the defendant, would often require considerable prepara-
tion and technical assistance.
Perhaps in contemplation of this situation, section 303(c) of the bill provides
that the court or master can subpoena expert witnesses and documents sua sponte.
However, if an expert witness were required to undertake independent study and pre-
pare expert testimony, subject only to the witness fees and travel expenses provided
under 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1970), this might constitute a taking of property without
due process of law.
In spite of the lack of any express statutory provision authorizing the award of
attorney fees, the district court that had granted plaintiffs an injunction in La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 3 ERC 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1971), later granted
plaintiffs' motion for recovery of fees from defendants, under the theory that plaintiffs
had acted as "private attorneys general" to effectuate the strong congressional policies
behind the statutes upon which the suit was based. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, No. C-71-
1166 RFP (N.D. Cal., Oct. 19, 1972).
36. See Gellhorn, supra note 33, at 369.
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all relevant documentary material in the public record,3" can help to
prevent the wars of attrition over discovery that are frequently waged in
the courts. In addition, the Administrative Conference of the United
States has recommended that agencies take affirmative steps to encourage
public participation by providing easy access to file information and
staff experts, furnishing free or low-cost transcripts, and waiving
multiple-copy filing and service requirements.3 8  Finally, the Comptroller
General of the United States recently ruled that the Federal Trade Com-
mission has discretionary authority to use its appropriations for the pur-
pose of paying attorneys' expenses, witness fees, and travel and sub-
sistence expenses for intervenors and their witnesses when this is nec-
essary to secure adequate participation.3 9  The reasoning of this ruling
seems equally applicable to agencies charged with responsibility for
protecting the environment. When the ruling is considered in con-
junction with the Scenic Hudson40 principle that an agency has an af-
firmative obligation to build a record adequate to resolve all substantial
issues raised by public intervenors,41 it is possible to conclude that a dra-
matic reduction in the financial barriers to public participation in admin-
istrative proceedings is now within reach.
II
VIABLE STANDARDS
Another major shortcoming of the recent citizen-suit proposals is
the extreme vagueness of the standards which they prescribe for courts
37. See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 9331, 9332 (1972) (Proposed Amendments to AEC
Rules of Practice for Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities):
The proposed amendments would . . . liberalize the current rules con-
siderably to provide for disclosure of more AEC documents as a matter of
course. With respect to such documents, those that are relevant to the pro-
ceeding would generally be publicly available as a matter of course unless
there is a compelling justification for their nondisclosure . . . . Since the
routinely available documents should, under this approach, reasonably disclose
the basis for the staff's position, staff-directed discovery could then be lim-
ited to information concerning a matter vital to a decision in the case and not
obtainable elsewhere . . . . It is emphasized that this proposal is not intended
to inhibit discovery procedures as a legitimate means of obtaining needed
information. It is, rather, an attempt to devise a means of making masses of
material readily and routinely available without resort to time-consuming and
perhaps less fruitful formal discovery procedures.
38. Admin. Conf. of the United States, Recommendation 28, Public Participa-
tion in Administrative Hearings (adopted Dec. 7, 1971).
39. 52 DECISIONS COMP. GEN. - (No. B-139703, July 24, 1972); cf. Students
Opposing Unfair Practices, Inc. v. FTC, 449 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971), concluding
that a nonprofit corporation which had been a public interest intervenor in an agency
proceeding was not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
(1970) for purposes of seeking judicial review of the agency's order.
40. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 1 ERC 1084 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
41. Id. at 620-21, 1 ERC at 1092-93.
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to use in resolving environmental issues. In the bill that is receiving
the most serious consideration by the Congress,"2 any person or class
of persons would be allowed to maintain an action for declaratory or
equtable relief against any individual or any private or public entity-
federal, state or local-if he could show that the defendants activity af-
fected interstate commerce and had or may have an adverse impact
upon "the air, water, land or public trust of the United States .
Once this negligible prima facie showing had been made, the burden
would shift to the defendant, and he would be required to make a
three-part showing: that there was no "feasible and prudent alterna-
tive" to the activity in question, that the activity was consistent with
and reasonably required for promotion of the public health, safety and
welfare, and that the social and economic benefits of the activity out-
weighed its social and economic costs.
44
These standards are at best nebulous and at worst utterly baf-
fling. What, for example, does the concept of "public trust" mean in
this context? Not even the proponents of the legislation seem to have
any clear idea, 45 yet this principle, and the three tests which must be
satisfied in order to present an affirmative defense, are standards de-
signed to regulate primary conduct in the day-to-day world of business
and governmental decision making.
As an illustration of some of the problems which this type of leg-
islation would create, the standards described above will be applied to
some hypothetical situations. Assume that in a city there are a dis-
tillery, a toy factory, a chemical plant producing napalm for the
armed forces, and a state penitentiary. Each burns coal for heat and
uses electricity obtained from an oil-burning utility company. A citi-
zen brings separate suits against each facility and has no difficulty mak-
ing the requisite prima facie showing, inasmuch as all consumption of
fossil fuels involves some air pollution. Furthermore, since the city's
sewage treatment facilities are overstrained, all the defendants contrib-
ute to water pollution. Thus, the burden shifts to all four defendants
to justify their activities.
42. H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302-03(a) (1971). S. 1032, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. §§ 3-4(a) (1971) are similar in this respect. See Appendices B & C.
43. H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a) (1971).
44. Id. S. 1032, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1971) differs slightly. It does
not expressly incorporate the social and economic cost-benefit criterion, but may have
substantially the same effect since it explicitly notes that activities are to be judged in
light of the nation's concern for a reasonable degree of environmental protection.
45. For example, in Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 7, at 553, the author's
survey of existing case law on the public trust doctrine concludes with the statement
that
[plerhaps the most striking impression produced by a review of public trust
cases in various jurisdictions is the sense of openness which the law provides;
there is generally support for whatever decision a court might wish to adopt.
[Vol. 2:407
CITIZEN SUITS
First, each must show that there is "no feasible and prudent al-
ternative" to its activity. But is this inquiry limited to alternative
sources of heat, power, and waste disposal or may the court consider
alternatives involving the total cessation of the defendants' activities?
If so, must the court consider the environmental effects if defendants
relocate elsewhere or if non-defendants expand to take over the de-
fendants lost "markets"? Is it a feasible and prudent alternative to re-
quire the distillery and the toy factory to install expensive anti-pollu-
tion equipment when this would impose greater costs of production
than those borne by their competitors?
Whatever alternatives the defendants adopt, short of ceasing to
operate, there will be some adverse impact on the environment
since all fuel consumption involves some pollution. Therefore, the
court must move to the second branch of the inquiry: whether the de-
fendants' activities are "consistent with and reasonably required for
promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare." Obviously, there
is room for differences of views here. Some observers might not con-
sider the operations of the distillery to be "reasonably required for pro-
motion of the public health, safety, and welfare." Others might object
to the activities of the chemical plant. Proponents of penal reform
might argue that liberal probation and the institution of "half-way
houses" are cheaper and preferable to maintaining penitentiaries. Even
some might be found who regard toy manufacturing as a frivolous
and antisocial activity, particularly if some of the factory's products
have fallen afoul of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act."8 Are the
merits of all these arguments and the subsidiary questions they raise to
be resolved by the district court in simultaneous lawsuits?
Do not forget the third inquiry: Do the social and economic
benefits of the activities outweigh the social and economic costs? This
question seems to overlap the second considerably, but it does intro-
duce additional elements. All the enterprises generate some employ-
ment. Displaced employees may or may not be absorbed into other
jobs. Perhaps the distiller's export sales have a positive effect on the
balance of payments. On the other hand, the toy company's president
asserts that if it is forced to cease operations, the company will move
to Taiwan. All these factors and many more arguably are relevant to
a balancing of the economic and social costs and benefits.
The plain fact that must be emphasized is that there is no wholly
"clean" source of power; consequently, any activity which uses energy
contributes its mite to air or water pollution. Yet the clear language
of this bill states that a prima facie case can be made against every
business activity in the country, against every automobile owner,
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74 (1970).
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against every homeowner, indeed against every user of electricity.
One searches in vain for any standard of de minimis or, more signifi-
cantly, for any suggestion that activities which are undertaken in com-
pliance with applicable standards or requirements imposed by appro-
priate governmental bodies should be considered reasonable per se.
Thus, virtually every enterprise or activity in the country might be re-
quired to justify its continued existence in legal proceedings on the
basis of an ad hoc, open-ended, and wholly nebulous balancing of social
costs and benefits.
Courts cannot be expected to provide wise resolutions for com-
plex environmental problems on the basis of "standards" that offer no
guidance as to the permissible scope of the issues, the relative weights
to be assigned to competing values, or the reliance to be placed on the
determinations of other branches of government. Business decisions
cannot be made on the basis of assurance by a preponderance of the
evidence that there is no "feasible and prudent alternative" to the pro-
posed activity and that "the social and economic benefits . . . out-
weigh the social and economic costs thereof." And corporations or
individuals who engage in private conduct not prohibited by law or
regulation should not be required to demonstrate in court that the ac-
tivity is "reasonably required for promotion of the public health, safe-
ty, and welfare." If such legislation were enacted, and if courts dili-
gently tried to discharge the duties thus thrust upon them, the resulting
chaos could wipe out many of the gains which have been made in the
field of environmental protection during the last decade.
It is true that the State of Michigan has had a law in effect for
two years which is basically similar to the citizen-suit proposals de-
scribed above,47 and has not experienced severe disruption of its gov-
ernmental functions.4 However, the implication of the Michigan ex-
perience for purposes of assessing a proposed federal law are far from
clear. Relatively few cases have been brought under the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act, in part because state environmental
groups have lacked the resources and expertise for litigation. 49  On
47. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 691.1201-07 (Supp. 1972).
Connecticut also has recently enacted analagous legislation declaring "a public
trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state" and permitting citizen
suits for declaratory or equitable relief from "unreasonable pollution, impairment or
destruction" of those resources. Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971,
CONN. GEN. STATS. ANN. §§ 22a-14 to -20 (Supp. 1972).
48. A description of the Michigan statute and the early cases brought under it
may be found in Sax & Connor, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of
1970: A Progress Report, 70 MicH. L. REV. 1003 (1972).
49. Sax & Conner, id. at 1007, report that only 36 actions were filed under the
Michigan EPA during the first sixteen months after it was passed. They conclude
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the other hand, the federal government's experience under NEPA,
with approximately 250 suits filed in less than three years,50 suggests
that citizen-suit legislation at the national level would inspire far more
litigation-particularly when it is remembered that NEPA applies to a
much more limited range of activity than the citizen-suit proposals.
The cases brought under the Michigan statute also illustrate that
plaintiffs can be expected to use the courts in attempts to achieve
sweeping realignments of governmental and private activity.5 Sim-
ilarly broad attacks on Government regulatory programs under a fed-
eral citizen-suit statute could be more disruptive than in the state con-
text, because of the greater factual complexity inherent in nationwide
issues, the large number of regulatory programs and agencies existing
in the federal government, and the more extensive and complex body
that state environmental groups "have thus far neither the funds nor the staff to
undertake an organized litigation program," id. at 1008, and that
ihe inability of plaintiffs to recruit expert witnesses or to launch expensive,
full-scale litigation has certainly undermined the potential usefulness of some
cases, and has prevented others even from being filed.
id. at 1080.
50. Information supplied to the authors by Philip Soper, General Counsel's Of-
fice, Council on Environmental Quality. See generally 1972 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
REPORT, supra note 6,' at 248-55.
51. For example, in Roberts v. Michigan, appeal docket, No. 13640, 2 ERC
1612 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971), an inventor of devices for controlling automobile ex-
haust emissions sought to use the Michigan Act as a means of effecting a radical re-
structuring of state transportation policies:
[The plaintiff] alleged first that the Secretary of State violated the [Act] by
granting licenses to operate motor vehicles that polluted the air and by failing
to adopt standards and regulations to control motor-vehicle-caused pollution.
The plaintiff sought to have adequate standards imposed by court order and to
have the licensing and operating of motor vehicles enjoined until such stand-
ards were established and enforced.
[He] also alleged that the State Highway Department was violating the
EPA by allocating tax money for construction and maintenance of highways
in the state, the use of which caused air pollution. Plaintiff sought the estab-
lishment of regulations to govern pollution arising from the use of highways,
and also asked that highway construction be enjoined unless and until ade-
quate safeguards dealing with this problem were adopted.
Sax & Connor, supra note 48, at 1017. The authors report the filing of another ambi-
tious case in which the plaintiff
sought to obtain by judicial mandate what other environmentalists hope to
accomplish through the [then] pending federal Water Pollution Control bill:
a no-discharge rule for Michigan streams and lakes.
Id. at 1019 n.71. The authors also note that
[tihe federal bill is itself hotly controverted as an unrealistic aspiration-
even for ten years hence when the bill takes effect and even with a multi-
billion dollar authorization for treatment works construction.
Id.
The Michigan courts have not yet had to grapple with the merits of such unman-
ageable cases. In Roberts the trial court concluded that the statute constituted an
impermissible delegation of legislative power as applied to the facts of the case, and
this ruling is currently on appeal; the water pollution suit was voluntarily dismissed
by the plaintiff. See id.
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of doctrine that has evolved in federal administrative law.12
I
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE INTERESTS
A final major flaw in some of the current citizen-suit proposals
is their tacit assumption that all environmental questions must be re-
solved as a matter of federal law, and that the interests of the state
governments are entitled to no weight. For example, the citizen-suit
bill previously discussed would permit suits by any individual or or-
ganization against "any department, agency, or instrumentality of...
a State or local government,"53 and would place upon these govern-
mental entities the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that there is "no feasible and prudent alternative" to the pro-
posed action, that it is "reasonably required for promotion of the pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare," and that it is justified in broad cost-
benefit terms.
54
While the Supreme Court has recently concluded that actions for
pollution abatement may be brought against the political subdivisions
of a state in the federal district courts consistent with the eleventh
amendment, 55 there is reason to doubt the wisdom of exercising this
power to its fullest extent. The range of state action which has some
impact on the environment of neighboring states is potentially quite
broad. For instance, the land-use policies of a states' political sub-
divisions may affect the kinds of industries which locate there or the rate
of its population growth and, consequently, the volume of pollutants
which cross into neighboring states.56 Yet it surely would be absurd to
have the federal courts review the actions of every local zoning board on
the merits.
52. For example, H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), makes no effort to
harmonize its provisions governing judicial review of environmental matters with other
statutes providing judicial review for particular kinds of agency action. Since the most
common form of judicial review is in the courts of appeals, the bill leaves open the
possibility that portions of the same controversy would be pending simultaneously at
different levels of the federal judicial system and in different areas of the country.
53. H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302(a), (b) (1971); S. 1032, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(a), (b) (1971).
54. H.R. 8331, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a) (1971). Compare S. 1032, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1971).
55. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 4 ERC 1001 (1972). See gener-
ally Garton, The State Versus Extraterritorial Pollution-States' "Environmental
Rights" Under Federal Common Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 313 (1972); Note, Federal
Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1972).
56. For example, decisions construing NEPA's standard of "major Federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the environment," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970), have
interpreted the provision quite broadly. See, e.g., Hanley v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640,
4 ERC 1153 (2d Cir. 1972); City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150,
3 ERC 1570 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 344 F. Supp. 929, 4 ERC 1646 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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The confusion and disruption in the relationships between fed-
eral agencies and courts that would be caused by the current citizen-
suit bills are likely to be compounded when federal courts are asked to
cope with the much more diverse structures, traditions, and relation-
ships found within the state governments. There are, to be sure,
strong federal interests in the field of environmental protection, such
as securing uniform implementation of federal laws, preventing state
action or inaction which has substantial extraterritorial environmental
effects, and preserving unique natural resources. The federal interest,
however, is not paramount in every respect, nor is it equally strong for
all types of environmental issues. Procedural forms and structures
can be devised which are far superior to the judicial forum in recog-
nizing the local, state, regional, and national interests which are at
stake in particular kinds of enivronmental issues, and in apportioning
decisional responsibility in accord with these legitimate interests.57
CONCLUSION
The many serious defects in the proposed citizen-suit bills should
not be allowed to obscure the fact that courts can continue to play a
vital role in the effort to safeguard the environment, and that a num-
ber of reforms can be made which would enhance the ability of citi-
zen groups to assist the courts in performing this task. In the area of
judicial review of administrative action, the environmentalists' long
battle to obtain standing to sue seems largely to be won. The Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Sierra Club v. Morton5 s suggests that
any threat to a citizen's scenic, cultural, historic, or environmental in-
terests constitutes sufficient "injury in fact" to confer standing under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 9 and that a litigant who achieves
57. For example, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-58a
(1970), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. V, 1970), contain congressional
findings that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary
responsibility of the States and local governments," and that "Federal financial as-
sistance and leadership is essential for the development of cooperative Federal, State,
regional, and local programs to prevent and control air pollution." Id. §§ 1857(a)
(3), (4). The Amendments contain a number of provisions designed to implement
this sharing of authority, such as the requirement that the Administrator of EPA re-
view and approve State implementation plans [id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)], and the provi-
sion that the Administrator establish a national program of research and development
in pollution control, and provide technical and financial assistance to the States in de-
veloping such control techniques. Id. §§ 1857b(a), (b).
For a discussion of the history of the federal role in air pollution control, see
generally Trumbull, supra note 3. For an interesting discussion of the varying interests
of federal, regional, state, and local governments regarding the generation of electric
power, see Electricity and the Environment, supra note 13, at I-1 to -8, VI1-1 to -47,
VUI-4 to -37.
58. 405 U.S. 727, 3 ERC 2039 (1972).
59. Section 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). The second half of the standing test,
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standing may assert nonpersonal "interests of the general public" in
support of his claim.60
Perhaps the next doctrinal barrier to fall will be the sovereign
immunity rule.61 The archaic and unintelligible doctrine that govern-
ment can not be sued when acting in its capacity as sovereign, has
been employed to bar some environmental suits, 2 and usually serves
merely to obscure analysis of the real issue of whether the govern-
mental activity in question has been committed to unreviewable agen-
cy discretion.6 3  Moreover, the difficult problem of discretion will
undoubtedly receive further attention from both the courts and the
commentators, and attempts will be made to develop more precise
guidelines to determine how much discretion an agency really needs in
order to perform specific functions effectively.6 4  In addition, the time
that "the alleged injury was to an interest 'arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated' by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have vio-
lated," [405 U.S. at 733, 3 ERC at 2041] presents little problem in the environmental
area, since the relevant statutes are typically designed to safeguard the environmental
interests of a large segment of the populace or of the entire nation.
60. Id. at 740 n. 15, 3 ERC at 2044 n. 15. The Court also reaffirmed the broad
latitude which Congress has to confer standing under a "private attorney general"
theory, consistent with the case-or-controversy limitation of article III of the Con-
stitution. Id. at 732 n.3, 3 ERC at 2041 n.3. However, congressional action of this
nature may be unnecessary if the lower federal courts construe the standing require-
ments in the generous fashion suggested by Sierra Club. See, e.g., EDF v. EPA,
- F.2d -, 4 ERC 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219,
4 ERC 1561 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
61. The sovereign immunity rule is based on the principle that the government
cannot be sued without its own consent. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous
Supreme Court in a 1907 decision, explained the rationale behind the doctrine as
follows:
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). The doctrine, however, has
long been subject to stringent criticism by legal commentators. See 3 K. DAvis, supra
note 10, § 25.01.
62. See, e.g., McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608, 3 ERC 1184 (10th Cir. 1971);
Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, 324 F.
Supp. 302, 2 ERC 1298 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze
Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339, 2 ERC 1771 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Bass Anglers
Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Ala. 1971);
Arthur v. Fry, 300 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
63. The Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended that
the Administrative Procedure Act be amended to abolish sovereign immunity as a bar
to judicial review of agency or official action. Recommendation 9, Statutory Reform
of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 1 AI)MIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES REP.
190 (1970). See also Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Ac-
tion: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 387 (1970).
64. The leading work on this problem is Professor Kenneth Culp Davis' book.
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). The Administrative Conference has con-
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seems ripe for a thorough re-examination of "non-statutory review" of
administrative action, in which the common law remedies of injunction,
mandamus, or declaratory judgment are sought pursuant to the general
federal-question jurisdiction statute6" and similar provisions. 6 On the
whole, however, the doctrinal tools necessary to obtain judicial review of
administrative action are already in existence, and readily accessible.
More extensive changes are being made in the area of citizen
suits directly against alleged polluters. The Clean Air Amendments
of 1970,7 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972,68 and the Noise Control Act of 197265 all provide that citizens
can bring actions directly against violators of the federal standards.
While it is still too early to determine the practical efficacy of these
provisions, and although there may be difficulties in coordinating citizen
suits with Government enforcement programs,7" this seems to be a sound
approach to the perennial problem of inadequate enforcement resources.
ducted a number of studies on discretionary agency activities, and has issued several
recommendations urging limitations on administrative discretion. See, e.g., Recom-
mendation 19, SEC No-Action Letters Under Section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933,
1 ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATEs REP. 34 (1970); Recommendation 27,
Procedures of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Respect to Change-of-
Status Applications (adopted Dec. 6, 1971); Recommendation 34, Procedures of the
United States Board of Parole (adopted June 9, 1972).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
66. See generally Cramton, supra note 63.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
68. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505 (Oct. 18, 1972), 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4825, 4913-14.
69. Pub. L No. 92-574, § 12 (Oct. 27, 1972), 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs -.
70. The citizen-suit provisions of both the Water Pollution Control Amendments
and the Clean Air Amendments contain several features designed to coordinate private
litigation with administrative enforcement. For example, section 304(b) of the
Clean Air Amendments [42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b)(1970)] provides that the citizen
plaintiff may not bring an action if the Administrator is diligently prosecuting a civil
claim against the defendant, and that the plaintiff must in any event give 60 days'
prior notice of his intent to bring suit to the Administrator, to the State in which the
violation occurred, and to the alleged violator. Once the citizen suit is commenced,
the Administrator may intervene as a matter of right. The Water Pollution Control
Amendments contain similar limitations. See Pub. L. No. 92-500, §§ 505(b) & (c)
(Oct. 18, 1972), 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4825, 4913-14.
Notwithstanding these carefully drawn provisions, however, it is conceivable that a
substantial volume of citizen litigation could disrupt EPA's enforcement program. If a
large number of citizen suits are pending, EPA may be confronted with a choice be-
tween postponing or forgoing other cases which it deems of higher priority in order to
participate in the citizen suits, or of staying out of these actions and thereby incurring
the risk that the citizen plaintiffs will make bad law, whether from lack of resources
or from failure to advance all relevant factors affecting the public interest. Moreover,
regardless of what res judicata or collateral estoppel effect is accorded the decision in
the citizen suit, there may be unfortunate consequences. If the result in the first
citizen suit precludes subsequent actions, either by other citizen plaintiffs or by the
Administrator, then a hasty, ill-prepared or under-funded effort by the first plaintiff
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Another significant expansion in the role of citizen litigation to
protect the environment was the Supreme Court's recent declaration in
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee71 of a federal common law right to abate in-
terstate pollution. This common law action, which is designed to op-
erate in the interstices of existing environmental statutes and be
guided by their principles,72 should prove a valuable supplement to ex-
isting enforcement programs. Finally, the concept of an implied right
of private action under anti-pollution statutes such as the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 189971 seems capable of further development at the in-
stance of enterprising litigants.
7 4
can effectively immunize activity which is causing harmful and unjustifiable pollution,
On the other hand, if the defendant cannot rely on a favorable decision as a bar to
subsequent actions, there is an obvious potential for harassment through multiple
litigation. The latter possibility seems remote so long as the financial burdens of liti-
gation remain substantial, but obviously any effort to make meritorious suits less costly
increases the risk of frivolous actions.
71. 406 U.S. 91, 4 ERC 1001 (1972).
72. The Court noted that "while the various environmental protection statutes
will not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common law, they may pro-
vide useful guidelines in fashioning . . . rules of decision." 406 U.S. at 103 n.5, 4
ERC at 1005 n.5. See Garton, supra note 55, at 320-31.
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970). The existence of an implied right of civil
action by the Government under section 15 of the Act [id. § 4091 was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191
(1967).
74. The logic of the Wyandotte Transportation case tends to support the ex-
istence of declaratory and injunctive relief for private parties as well as for the Govern-
ment. The basic rationale for this type of action is simple, and long established:
[D]isregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is
implied, according to a doctrine of the common law.
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). More pragmatic rationales
for the implied right of private action are the impossibility of agencies' achieving full
enforcement of regulatory statutes, and the potential inadequacy of available remedies
at state law. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Several recent decisions have rejected private parties' attempts to bring qui tam
actions under the provision of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 which states that
one-half of the fine imposed for violation of the criminal sections shall "be paid to
the person or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction." 33 U.S.C.
§ 411 (1970). Instead, the courts have concluded that the statute allows an in-
former to recover only after the Government has brought and successfully prosecuted
a criminal case on the basis of information supplied. See, e.g., Connecticut Action
Now v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 3 ERC 1934 (2d Cir. 1972), Guthrie v.
Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140, 2 ERC 1692 (N.D. Ala. 1971); Bass
Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302,
2 ERC 1298 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc.,
329 F. Supp. 339, 2 ERC 1771 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
However, these decisions do not seem dispositive of the question of whether an
implied right of private action exists under certain provisions of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, and may simply reflect the longstanding judicial hostility to informers'
actions. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 37 U.S. 537, 560-61 (1943)
(Jackson, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Brensilber v. Bausch & Lamb, 131 F.2d
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On the whole, then, there are numerous and growing opportuni-
ties for citizen litigation to protect the environment, and the public in-
terest lawsuit will doubtless remain an essential facet of the total effort
to reverse the destruction of our natural heritage. But courts and law-
suits cannot do the whole job, or even the major portion of it. The
drama of courtroom conflict and the exhilaration of clearcut victories
may be emotionally satisfying, but they cannot substitute for the hard
work of amassing detailed factual data, organizing informed public
support for environmental causes, and helping to make the necessary
tradeoffs and interest balancing through participation in legislatures,
planning councils, and administrative agencies. If the environment is
to be protected, the major effort must be made in these arenas.
545 (2d Cir. 1942), aff d by an equally divided court, 320 U.S. 711 (1943).
And in Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. State of California, 437 F.2d 1087, 2 ERC
1175 (9th Cir. 1971)-a suit alleging that defendant's filling of the San Francisco Bay
violated sections 401-06 of the Act-the court assumed that a private right of action
would lie to enjoin illegal filling. That decision has since been followed in Sierra Club
v. Leslie Salt Co., - F. Supp. -, 4 ERC 1663 (N.D. Cal. 1972), which distinguished
cases denying a private right of action on the basis that they involved sections 407 and
411 of the Act-which provides only for criminal penalties-and not sections 401-06,
which provide for injunctive relief as well. - F. Supp. at -, 4 ERC at 1666 n.2.
And see Hawkinson v. Blandin Paper Co., 347 F. Supp. 820, 4 ERC 1009 (D. Minn.
1972) (federal jurisdiction upheld where plaintiff alleged that violation of Refuse Act





92d Cong., 1st Sess.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A BILL to amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to
provide for class actions in the United States district courts against
persons responsible for creating certain environmental hazards.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new tifle:
TITLE III
CLASS ACTIONS TO PROTECT ENVIRONMENT
SEC. 301. (a) The Congress finds and declares that each per-
son has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environ-
ment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the environment.
(b) The Congress further finds and declares (1) that existing
provisions of Federal law are insufficient to protect various groups of
persons from the harmful effects of air, water, and noise pollution, and
(2) that civil actions on behalf of classes or groups of persons in-
jured or endangered can be an effective and useful machinery for the
protection against these harmful effects.
(c) The Congress further finds and declares that many States
provide no remedy under State law whereby many persons, each hav-
ing a small claim, can seek redress in the courts for the hazards and
harmful effects to which they are subjected as a result of the pollu-
tion of ai- and water and as a result of unreasonable noises. it is,
therefore, in the public interest to provide a Federal remedy for groups
having a common interest in that they are adversely affected by these
environmental hazards.
(d) The Congress further finds and declares that air and water
pollution and the creation of unreasonable noises have a deleterious ef-
fect on the health and welfare of persons who are exposed to these
hazards. The Congress further finds that these environmental haz-
ards are largely caused by persons who are engaged in interstate com-
merce, or in activities affecting interstate commerce.
SEC. 302. Any person who is engaged in any activity which af-
fects interstate commerce and who is responsible for any pollution of
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air or water or for the creation of any unreasonable noise shall be
subject to liability in monetary damages, injunction, declaratory judg-
ment, or other appropriate relief in a class action brought by any per-
son representing the interest of a group or class of persons whose lives,
safety, health, property, or welfare has been endangered or adversely
affected in any way by such pollution or noise.
SEC. 303. The United States district courts shall have jurisdic-
tion of class actions brought under section 302 of this title without re-
gard to the amount in controversy.
SEC. 304. The remedies provided by this title are in addition
to, and not in derogation of, any other remedies which may be avail-
able under any statute or common law, and nothing in this title shall




92d Cong., 1st Sess.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A BILL to amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to pro-
vide for citizens actions in the United States district courts against
persons responsible for creating certain environmental hazards.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new title:
TITLE III
CITIZENS' ACTIONS TO PROTECT ENVIRONMENT
SEC. 301. (a) The Congress finds and declares that each per-
son is entitled by right to the protection, preservation, and enhancement
of the air, water, land, and public trust of the United States and that
each person has the responsibility to contribute to the protection and
enhancement thereof.
(b) The Congress further finds and declares (1) that existing
provisions of Federal law are insufficient to protect the air, water, land,
and public trust of the United States from pollution, impairment, or de-
struction and (2) that civil actions initiated by individual persons or
classes or groups of persons injured or endangered can be an effec-




SEC. 302. (a) Any person may maintain an action for declara-
tory or equitable relief in his own behalf or in behalf of a class of per-
sons similarly situated, for the protection of the air, water, land, or
public trust of the United States from pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion, wherever such activity and such action for relief constitute a case
or controversy. Such action may be maintained against any person
engaged in such activity and may be brought, without regard to the
amount in controversy, in the district court of the United States for any
judicial district in which the defendant resides, transacts business or
may be found; Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent or preempt State courts from exercising jurisdiction in such
action. Any complaint in any such action shall be supported by affi-
davits of not less than two technically qualified persons stating that to
the best of their knowledge the activity which is the subject to [sic] the
action damages or reasonably may damage the air, water, land, or public
trust of the United States by pollution, impairment, or destruction.
Copies of any pleadings filed pursuant to this Act shall also be filed with
the Council on Environmental Quality.
(b) For the purpose of this Act, the term "person" means any
individual or organization; or any department, agency, or instrumen-
tality of the United States, a State or local government, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or possession of the
United States.
SEc. 303. (a) When the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing
that the activity of the defendant affecting interstate commerce has
resulted in or reasonably may result in pollution, impairment, or des-
truction of the air, water, land, or public trust of the United States,
the defendant shall have the burden of establishing (1) that there is no
feasible and prudent alternative, (2) that the activity at issue is con-
sistent with and reasonably required for promotion of the public
health, safety, and welfare in light of the paramount concern of the
United States for the protection of its air, water, land, and public trust
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, and (3) that the social and
economic benefits of defendants' enterprise or activity outweigh the
social and economic costs thereof.
(b) The court may appoint a master to take testimony and make
a report to the court in the action.
(c) The court or master, as well as the parties to the action, may
subpena expert witnesses and require the production of records, doc-
uments, and all other information necessary to a just disposition of the
case.




(e) No bond shall be required by the court of the plaintiff: Pro-
vided, That the court may, upon clear and convincing evidence of-
fered by the defendant, impose a requirement for security to cover the
costs and damages as may be incurred by defendant when relief is
wrongfully granted: Provided further, That such security shall not be
required of plaintiff if the requirement thereof would unreasonably
hinder plaintiff in the maintenancy of his action or would tend to
prevent a full and fair hearing on the activities complained of, and shall
in no case exceed $500.
(f) Compliance with State laws or regulations, or with Federal
regulations, shall not be a defense but shall be admissible as evidence
that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the activity at issue.
SEC. 304. The court may grant declaratory relief, temporary
and permant equitable relief, or may impose conditions on the de-
fendant which are required to protect the air, water, land, or public
trust of the United States from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
SEC. 305. This Act shall be supplementary to existing adminis-
trative and regulatory procedures provided by law and in any action
maintained under the Act, the court may remand the parties to such
procedures: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be deemed to
prevent the granting of interim equitable relief where required and
so long as is necessary to protect the rights recognized herein: Pro-
vided further, That any person entitled to maintain an action under
this Act may intervene as a party in all such procedures: Provided
further, That nothing herein shall be deemed to prevent the mainte-
nance of an action, as provided in this Act to protect the rights recog-
nized herein, where existing administrative and regulatory procedures
are found by the court to be inadequate for the protection of such
rights: Provided further, That at the initiation of any person en-
titled to maintain an action under the Act, such procedures shall be
reviewable in a court of competent jurisdiction to the extent necessary
to protect the rights recognized herein: And provided further, That in
any such judicial review the court shall be bound by the provisions,
standards, and procedures of sections 302, 303, and 304 of this Act,
and may order that additional evidence be taken with respect to the
environmental issues involved.
SEC. 306. The court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to this Act, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees). No award of such costs
shall be made against either party where the court determines that the
prospect of an award of such costs would unreasonably hinder ei-
ther the maintenance or the defense of any action brought under this
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title, or would tend to prevent a full and fair hearing on the activities
complained of.
SEC. 307. The remedies provided by this title are in addition to,
and not in derogation of, any other remedies which may be avail-
able under any statute or common law.
APPENDIX C
S. 1032
92d Cong., 1st Sess.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
A BILL to promote and protect the free flow of interstate commerce
without unreasonable damage to the environment; to assure that ac-
tivities which affect interstate commerce will not unreasonably in-
jure environmental rights; to provide a right of action for relief for
protection of the environment from unreasonable infringement by
activities which affect interstate commerce and to establish the right
of all citizens to the protection, preservation, and enhancement of
the environment.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may
be cited as the "Environmental Protection Act of 1971".
SEC. 2. (a) The Congress finds and declares that each person
is entitled by right to the protection, preservation, and enhancement of
the air, water, land, and public trust of the United States and that each
person has the responsibility to contribute to the protection and en-
hancement thereof.
(b) The Congress further finds and declares that it is in the pub-
lic interest to provide each person with an adequate remedy to protect
the air, water, land, and public trust of the United States from unrea-
sonable pollution, impairment, or destruction.
(c) The Congress further finds and declares that hazards to the
air, water, land, and public trust of the United States are caused largely
by persons who are engaged in interstate commerce, or in activities
which affect interstate commerce.
SEC. 3. (a) Any person may maintain an action for declaratory
or equitable relief in his own behalf or in behalf of a class of persons
similarly situated, for the protection of the air, water, land, or public
trust of the United States from unreasonable pollution, impairment, or
destruction which results from or reasonably may result from any ac-
tivity which affects interstate commerce, wherever such activity and such
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action for relief constitute a case or controversy. Such action may be
maintained against any person engaged in such activity and may be
brought, without regard to the amount in controversy, in the district court
of the United States for any judicial district in which the defendant
resides, transacts business, or may be found: Provided, That nothing
herein shall be construed to prevent or preempt State courts from ex-
ercising jurisdiction in such action. Any complaint in any such action
shall be supported by affidavits of not less than two technically qualified
persons stating that to the best of their knowledge the activity which is
the subject of the action damages or reasonably may damage the air,
water, land, or public trust of the United States by pollution, impairment,
or destruction.
(b) For the purpose of this section, the term "person" means
any individual or organization; or any department, agency, or instru-
mentality of the United States, a State or local government, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a posses-
sion of the United States.
SEC. 4. (a) When the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing
that the activity of the defendant affecting interstate commerce has re-
sulted in or reasonably may result in unreasonable pollution, impair-
ment, or destruction of the air, water, land, or public trust of the United
States the defendant shall have the burden of establishing that there is
no feasible and prudent alternative and that the activity at issue is consist-
ent with and reasonably required for promotion of the public health,
safety, and welfare in light of the paramount concern of the United
States for the protection of its air, water, land, and public trust from
unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruction.
(b) The court may appoint a master to take testimony and make
a report to the court in the action.
(c) The court or master, as well as the parties to the action, may
subpoena expert witnesses and require the production of records, doc-
uments, and all other information necessary to a just disposition of the
case.
(d) Costs may be apportioned to the parties if the interests of
justice require.
(e) No bond shall be required by the court of the plaintiff: Pro-
vided, That the court may, upon clear and convincing evidence offered
by the defendant that the relief required will result in irreparable dam-
age to the defendant, impose a requirement for security to cover the
costs and damages as may be incurred by defendant when relief is
wrongfully granted: Provided further, That such security shall not be
required of plaintiff if the requirement thereof would unreasonably
hinder plaintiff in the maintenance of his action or would tend unrea-
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sonably to prevent a full and fair hearing on the activities complained
of.
SEC. 5. The court may grant declaratory relief, temporary and
permanent equitable relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant
which are required to protect the air, water, land, or public trust of
the United States from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
SEc. 6. This Act shall be supplementary to existing administra-
tive and regulatory procedures provided by law and in any action main-
tained under the Act the court may remand the parties to such proce-
dures: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent
the granting of interim equitable relief where required and so long as is
necessary to protect the rights recognized herein: Provided further,
That any person entitled to maintain an action under this Act may in-
tervene as a party in all such procedures: Provided further, That noth-
ing herein shall be deemed to prevent the maintenance of an ac-
tion, as provided in this Act, to protect the rights recognized herein,
where existing administrative and regulatory procedures are found by
the court to be inadequate for the protection of such rights: Provided
further, That at the initiation of any person entitled to maintain an ac-
tion under the Act, such procedures shall be reviewable in a court of
competent jurisdiction to the extent necessary to protect the rights rec-
ognized herein: And provided further, That in any such judicial review
the court shall be bound by the provisions, standards, and procedures
of sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Act, and may order that additional evi-
dence be taken with respect to the environmental issues involved.
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